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CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY ADVISORY COUNCIL'S
RECOMMENDATIONS ON IMPASSE RESOLUTION
PROCEDURES AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEE STRIKES
INTRODUCTION
Governmental employee unions are the fastest growing sector of
organized labor in the United States.' California, which has over
890,000 public employees, 2 is feeling the repercussions generated by
employees who are frustrated with the laws which govern and re-
strict their right to collectively bargain. In the words of Loren V.
Smith, general manager of the California State Employees Asso-
ciation (CSEA):
Our golden state-the richest, most populous state in the nation-
once in the forefront of progressive action, today trails virtually
every other large state in dealing with its own employees.3
This growing sense of frustration has been manifested, most dram-
atically, in a number of public employee strikes. In California there
were over 60 strikes, or other work actions in the nature of strikes,
between the beginning of 1969 and mid-summer, 1972.
4
California public employees are currently covered by a patch-
work quilt of laws regulating their rights to collectively negotiate,
or at least meet and confer, with their employers in regard to wages,
hours, and working conditions. These laws include: the Winton
Act 5 which covers public school teachers; the George Brown Act6
covering employees of State Colleges and Universities, and employ-
1. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LABOR-
MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR STATE Am LOCAL GOVERNMENT 5 (1969) [herein-
after cited as ACIR].
2. PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS INFORMATION EXCHANGE, U.S. DEP'T.
OF LABOR, STATE PROFILES: CURRENT STATUS OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELA-
TIONS 10 (1971) [hereinafter cited as STATE PROFILES].
3. Smith, California Experience: Avoidance of Public Employee Strikes,
in THE ROLE OF THE NEUTRAL IN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DISPUTES 48 (H. Anderson
ed. 1972).
4. Cebulski, An Analysis of 22 Illegal Strikes and California Law, 18
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS (CPER) 2, 3 (August 1973) [here-
inafter cited as Cebulski].
5. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13080-90 (West Supp. 1973).
6. CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 3525-36 (West Supp. 1973).
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ees of the State of California; and the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act
(MMBA) 7 governing most county and municipal employees,8 one
provision of which9 grants authority to local governments to prom-
ulgate rules and regulations applicable to their employee-employer
relations, thereby prompting the enactment of a number of unique
local ordinance throughout the state.10
All of these Acts and ordinances contain differing policies re-
garding the extent of their recognition of traditional collective bar-
gaining principles." With the exception of sections 1961-1963 of
the Labor Code which specifically prohibits strikes by fire-fighters,
the present statutes governing public employment neither author-
ize nor prohibit strikes in the public sector.12
Criticism of these overlapping and confusing statutes,18 coupled
with the rising tide of public sector work stoppages, led the Cali-
fornia Assembly to pass House Resolution 5114 which established
the Assembly Advisory Council on Public Employee Relations.
This Council was charged with the duty to review the effectiveness
of the present statutes pertaining to employee-employer relations;
to study the trends of other states and the needs of California in
this area; and to issue a report containing specific proposals for
settling disputes between public jurisdictions and their employees.' 5
Based on testimony adduced at three public hearings held dur-
ing the summer of 1972, and the experience and research of the
7. CAL. Gov'T. CODE §§ 3500-10 (West Supp. 1973).
8. In addition to the above cited statutes, California fire-fighters are
covered by § 1960-63 of the Labor Code. Executive Order 71-3, issued by
Governor Reagan on Feb. 23, 1971, states an employer-employee policy for
state civil service employees and non-academic employees of the state col-
leges and universities.
9. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 3507 (West Supp. 1973).
10. See Ross & De Gialluly, Implementation of the Meyers-Milias-Brown
Act by California's Counties and Larger Cities, 8 CPER 6 (March 1971).
11. In regard to impasse resolution procedures the MMBA provides for
voluntary recourse to mediation, CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 3505.2 (West Supp.
1973); the Winton Act provides that the parties may adopt non-binding dis-
pute settlement procedures including fact-finding, CAL. EDuc. CODE § 13087.1
(West Supp. 1973).
12. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13088 (West Supp. 1973) (Winton Act) and CAL.
Gov'T. CODE § 3509 (West 1966) both provide that nothing in these re-
spective acts shall be construed as making § 923 of the Labor Code ap-
plicable to public employees. Section 923 of the Labor Code has been judi-
cially interpreted as sanctioning, inter alia, concerted activities and strikes
by private sector employees. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v.
The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d 684, 355 P.2d 905, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1960).
13. See Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining in California: The Meyers-
Milias-Brown Act in the Courts, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 719 (1971-72).
14. CAL. ASSENMLY, HousE REs. 51 (1972).
15. Id.
[voL. 11: 473, 1974] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Council members,18 the Council issued a comprehensive report, in-
cluding legislative recommendations, in March, 1973.17
In addition to recommendations for a single law to replace the
present scheme of divergent statutes applicable to various employee
groups, and the establishment of a Public Employee Relations
Board (PERB) to administer the new law, the Council made spe-
cific proposals regarding dispute settlement procedures and strikes.' s
The Council's proposed establishment of a mandatory "arsenal
of weapons" approach to be used in resolving labor disputes, should
the parties fail to voluntarily provide their own procedures, is in
marked contrast to present statutory schemes. These proposals, if
enacted, would displace many of the current practices in public em-
ployee negotiations in California. Further, the Council's recom-
mendation that public employes be given the legal right to strike
should generate considerable discussion among members of the
State Legislature, public sector labor organizations, the legal com-
munity and the public at large.
This article will focus on the Council's discussion of the contro-
versial issues of dispute settlement procedures and strikes, and
the effect that the proposed legislation, if enacted, would have on
the practice of collective bargaining in California's public sector.
STRIS
In addition to the elliptical prohibitions of stikes contained in the
California statutes governing public employees,19 a number of Cal-
ifornia courts of appeal have denied these employees the legal right
16. The Council was chaired by Professor Benjamin Aaron, Director of
the Institute of Industrial Relations at U.C.L.A. The other members of the
Council were Howard S. Block, a Santa Ana Attorney; Morris L. Meyers, a
San Francisco arbitrator and mediator; Don Vial, Chairman of the Center
for Labor Research and Education, Institute of Industrial Relations, U.C.
Berkeley; and Donald H. Wollett, Professor of Law at U.C. Davis.
17. California State Assembly, Final Report of the Assembly Advisory
Council on Public Employee Relations (March 15, 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Final Report].
18. See Advisory Council on Public Employee Relations, 17 CPER 15(June 1973) (summary of the Council's recommendations) or Final Report,
supra note 17 at 6-24.
19. CAr. EDuc. CODE § 13088 (West Supp. 1973); CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 3509
(West 1966). See note 12, supra.
to strike.20 These cases hold that public employee strikes are con-
trary to the common law and against public policy. Furthermore,
the decisions state that the courts shall continue to declare public
employees' strikes illegal until such time as the legislature specifi-
cally confers upon public employees the right to strike.21
Not only is a strike by public employees illegal, but a binding
agreement negotiated after a public employee (teachers') strike in
Los Angeles has been held to be void. The Court of Appeals for
the Second District ruled in Grasko v. Los Angeles City School
Board of Education22 that
... it was contrary to public policy for public school employees
who were conducting an illegal strike to exact a consideration for
the cessation of that illegal activity. The subject agreement was
therefore void (not merely voidable) and the trial court properly
enjoined its threatened consummation.2 3
The District Courts of Appeal which have ruled on the issue are
unanimous in their holding that public employee strikes are illegal.
Thus, it is apparent that these judicial pronouncements will con-
tinue to be the law until such time as the California Supreme Court
decides to review the legality of public employee strikes, or legis-
lation is enacted to change the applicable statutes.2 4
20. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. United Teachers-Los Angeles,
24 Cal. App. 3d 142, 100 Cal. Rptr. 806 (2nd Dist. 1972); Trustees of the
California State Colleges v. Local 1352, San Francisco State College Fed-
eration of Teachers, 12 Cal. App. 3d 863, 92 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1st Dist. 1970);
City of San Diego v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal
Employees, Local 127, 8 Cal. App. 3d 308, 87 Cal. Rptr. 258 (4th Dist.
1970); Almond v. County of Sacramento, 276 Cal. App. 2d 32, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 518 (3rd Dist. 1969).
21. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. United Teachers-Los Angeles,
24 Cal. App. 3d 142, 145, 100 Cal. Rptr. 806, 808 (2nd Dist. 1972). For the
view that California public employees do have the right to strike absent
any specific legislative denial of that right, see 2 CPER 51 (August 1969)
for the Superior Court decision granting San Diego city workers the right
to strike. However, this lower court decision was subsequently reversed
by City of San Diego v. American Federation of State, County and Mu-
nicipal Employees, Local 127, 8 Cal. App. 3d 308, 87 Cal. Rptr. 258 (4th
Dist. 1970).
22. 31 Cal. App. 3d 290, 107 Cal. Rptr. 334 (2nd Dist. 1973).
23. Id. at 298, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 339. Contrary to this ruling the actual
practice of collective bargaining may often involve the situation where,
"[t]he unions are in a position, as a practical matter, to offer the public
employers a de facto, if not Willistonian, consideration to support the
agreement reached in bargaining. This is their own promise not to strike
.... While this may not be a legal consideration, it is nevertheless a
valuable one .... " Smith, Comment of Russell A. Smith on a Paper
Delivered by Howard S. Block on Criteria in Public Sector Interest Dis-
putes, in Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting, National
Academy of Arbitrators, at 181 (1971).
24. Three major public sector collective bargaining bills were introduced
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Current statutory scheme and case law notwithstanding, the
Council recommends that public employees be given the legal
right to strike when the bargaining parties have been unable to
reach an agreement, 25 and after they have exhausted the "arsenal
of weapons" 26 approach to a negotiated settlement. However, un-
der the Council's proposed statute, any person affected by the
strike, including public employers, citizens and taxpayers, could
ask the court for injunctive relief to prevent or stop the strike.2 7
The issuance of an injunction, including a temporary restraining
order, would have to be based on:
findings of fact supported by evidence elicited at a hearing
that the strike or lockout imminently threatens public health or
safety .... If the Court does not make these findings ...
the strike or lockout should be permitted to commence or con-
tinue; but the court should have discretion to maintain jurisdic-
tion of the case until the dispute is resoloved. 28
Over the past decade the merits of legalizing public employee
strikes have been extensively debated by the commentators 29
in the first session of the 1973-74 California Legislature. The Moretti Bill
(AB 1243) which is directly based on the Council's proposed legislation,
passed the Assembly 42 to 30 and was sent to the Senate, where it was
still in committee as the session adjourned on September 14, 1973. The
Dills Bill (SB 32) provides for statutory impasse resolution procedures
including mediation and fact-finding; but in regard to strikes, the Bill
states that its enactment shall not be construed as making the provisions
of Section 923 of the Labor Code applicable to public employees (thereby
maintaining the status quo on the issue of public sector strikes). The
Dills Bill passed the Senate 21 to 14 but was still in an Assembly Com-
mittee as the session closed. It is likely that both bills will receive
further attention when the Legislature reconvenes on January 7, 1974.
Governor Reagan has indicated that he would veto the Morretti Bill be-
cause of its "legalized strike" provisions but sign the Dills Bill if it retains
its anti-strike position in its final form. See 18 CPER 29 (August 1973).
The Moscone Bill (AB 400) which was based on the Council's recommen-
dations but only applied to public school teachers passed both houses of
the Legislature. The Bill was vetoed by Governor Reagan on October 1,
1973, partly because he thought that it would "legalize" teacher strikes.
25. Final Report, supra note 17, at 238.
26. See text accompanying notes 53-56, infra.
27. Final Report, supra note 17, at 239.
28. Id.
29. Compare Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes
by Public Employees, 79 Y E L.J. 418 (1969-70) (support of a limited
right to strike as essential to effective collective bargaining) with
Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Em-
ployment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1968-69) (against public employee strikes
because of disproportionate power theory).
and the Council's report should add fuel to the fire. The Council
argued that public sector strikes should be legalized for a number
of reasons.
A credible strike possibility provides the necessary motivation
for the parties to negotiate an agreement rather than face the in-
herent difficulties involved in a strike or lockout situation. The
theory that uncertainty within the context of ongoing bargaining
provides negotiators with necessary motivation is widely sub-
scribed to by labor relations experts"° and has been succinctly
stated by Charles T. Douds:
Collective bargaining thrives on uncertainty as to what each of the
parties will do in the event of an impasse .... The uncertainty
on both sides of the bargaining table gives meaning to collective
bargaining.3 1
At present, public employers experience little uncertainty in bar-
gaining where strikes are prohibited and the final disposition of
the impasse is a management prerogative. The burden of uncer-
tainty is placed entirely upon the employees, and consequently the
employees often doubt that the dispute will be fully considered
or settled fairly.
Another closely related argument the Council advances against
the strike ban is that outlawing public sector strikes may encourage
strikes rather than deter them. The Council argues that "[b] e-
cause some public employers-confident that their employees will
not strike illegally-fail to respond in good faith to proposals made
by employee rerpesentatives , "32 they thereby encourage the
frustrations that lead to strikes.
Strike prohibitions are not simply ineffectual, though they are un-
deniably that. What is far more serious, they warp this vital pro-
cess. They bring employees to the bargaining table, but as in-
feriors. Simultaneously they provide false reassurance to manage-
ment representatives and induce less than genuine negotiations.
Ironically, they create the very tensions, exacerbate the very situa-
tions, provoke the very strikes they were allegedly formulated to
prevent.33
Reporting that only a small minority of the witnesses who testi-
fied at the public hearings or submitted written statements sup-
30. See Douds, Pennsylvania Experience: Background of Public Em-
ployee Law, in THE ROLE OF T=E NEUTRAL IN PUBLEC EmPLOYEE DisPuTEs 51
(H. Anderson ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Douds].
31. Id. at 58.
32. Final Report, supra note 17, at 232-33.
33. Address by Jerry Wurf, President of American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, to United States Conference
of Mayors, June 19, 1967, cited in Note, Labor-Management Relations and
Public Employees Engaged in Protective Functions: Policemen and Fire-
men as Sui Generis, 5 GA. L. REv. 540, 549 (1970-71).
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ported a blanket prohibition of these strikes, while another minority
favored banning strikes by police and fire-fighters, the Council
stated that a majority of witnesses believed that " . . . state and
local employees should have the right to strike in order to make
genuine collective bargaining possible."8 4
Some authorities have proposed a compromise between the ex-
treme positions of giving public employees complete freedom to
strike and the present absolute prohibition of strikes in the public
sector, based on whether or not the employees are essential or non-
essential to the community welfare.3 5 Rejecting this suggestion,
the Council stated:
It is relatively easy to gain consensus that police and fire pro-
tection are essential services, and that some minor clerical func-
tions are not. But in respect of the great number of services that
lie between the two poles of absolute essentiality and absolute
non-essentiality there is not even the beginning of consensus,
only disagreement.S6
This conclusion seems correct not only because of the inherent
difficulties in categorizing public employees as either essential or
non-essential but because "a limited right to strike for 'non-essen-
tial' employment categories would, in the last analysis, be an
empty gesture to those employees with limited bargaining power."a7
An analysis of the Council's recommendations and supporting
arguments in relation to some of California's recent public sector
collective bargaining experiences, appears to support the Council's
logic. A recent comparative study8 of 22 illegal strikes in Cali-
fornia concluded that:
[t]he law may deter some strikes, and the injunction may have a
sobering effect on others, and, therefore the law may not be en-
tirely without effect. However, these 22 strikes provide the ines-
capable conclusion that the present law does not realize its pur-
pose-it does not prevent public employee strikes. 9
34. Final Report, supra note 17, at 232, citing Collective Bargaining in
American Government: Report of the Western Assembly, 13 CPER 16
(June 1972).
35. Burton & Krider, supra note 29.
36. Final Report, supra note 17, at 230.
37. T. GILROY & A. SNiCROPI, DisPuTE SEmTLmNT IN THE PuBLIc SEcToR:
THE-STATE-or-T-ART 116 (U.S. Dep't. of Labor, Public Sector Labor Rela-
tions Information Exchange, 1972) [hereinafter cited as GILROY & SNi-
CROPI].
38. Cebulski, supra note 4.
39. Id. at 17.
This study emphasized that present laws do not deter strikes,
and furthermore, that once an illegal strike is instituted the law
has very little effect in compelling the strikers to return to work.
Part of the reason for this is that many public employers hesitate
to request an injunction because they believe that the employees
would continue to strike, thereby forcing the employer to either
initiate contempt proceedings and subject his employees to quasi-
criminal penalties, or stand idly and ineffectually by as the illegal
strike continues. Either of these alternatives, if pursued, would
have a deleterious effect on future employee-management rela-
tions once the strike is settled.
An example of the struggle the judiciary has had in applying
"no-strike" laws can be seen in Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v.
United Teachers,40 a case involving the 1970 Los Angeles teachers'
strikes, wherein the appellate court noted that on April 13, 1970,
the superior court judge granted a temporary restraining order
against the teachers41 and "despite the restraining order, a teachers'
strike commenced on April 13, 1970. ' '42 The appellate court's
written opinion itself suggests the impotency of the present law
to act as a deterrent on public employees who have decided to
strike, as it reports the commencement of the month-long strike
concurrent with the issuance of the restraining order. When public
employees strike in defiance of court orders,
[n]ot only is the law itself considerably weakened ... but court
orders, upon which enforcement rests, may appear to lose prestige.
Courts understandably may begin to exercise their inherent dis-
cretion to deny or modify orders rather than issue injunctions and
restraining orders which go unheeded by employees and unen-
forced by employers.43
Also, "no-strike laws" are, in practical application, a nullity,
since oftentimes the final agreement reached by the parties pro-
vides for the reinstatement of the striking employees, with am-
nesty for those who were found in contempt of court for disre-
garding an injunction.44
Legislation which would take into account the dynamics of col-
lective bargaining, specifically the motivational spur to bargain
created by the apprehension of a credible strike threat, and which
provides a -detailed procedure for resolving disputes within a frame-
40. 24 Cal. App. 3d 142, 100 Cal. Rptr. 806 (2nd Dist. 1972).
41. Id. at 144, 100 Cal. Rptr. 807.
42. Id.
43. Cebulski, supra note 4, at 17.
44. Id. at 13. See also 3 CPER 35 (November 1969). A strike by
policemen and firefighters in Vallejo, California ended with all the striking
employees being reinstated.
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work of continuing negotiations, encouraged by skilled neutrals,
would be a more effective deterrent to strikes than the present
myopic prohibitions.
But, so long as public school teachers regard the Winton Act's
"meet and confer" provisions as "meet and defer", or as long as
some police officers view their system of labor relations as "collec-
tive begging,"45 it will be extremely difficult to establish a viable
and effective bilateral system of labor relations. Without the pro-
vision for the right to strike in a statutory scheme, public employ-
ees will very likely continue to see themselves as second class em-
ployees, and public employers will continue to exacerbate the situa-
tion by declining to give sufficient consideration to the employees'
viewpoint because they believe that the employees will not strike
in violation of the law. If both sides to the negotiations realize
that, should they fail to reach agreement, there is an imminent pos-
sibility of a strike or a lockout, then the negotiators and neutrals
would be compelled to bargain within the context of reality rather
than polite exchanges of viewpoints in which management has
the ultimate authority.
IMPASSE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
In addition to legalizing the strike, within certain boundaries, as
a means of reducing the incidence of strikes, the Council discussed
and made recommendations on the implementation of dispute settle-
ment procedures in order to achieve more harmonious public sector
labor relations. The settlement of impasses within the framework
of ongoing negotiations is probably the best way to avert strikes
and also to build a relationship of mutual trust and respect between
employees and management.
At the outset, a distinction must be drawn between impasses aris-
ing out of interest disputes and those resulting from rights dis-
putes. Rights disputes, commonly referred to as grievances, arise
from a disagreement on the application or interpretation of an exist-
ing collective bargaining agreement, whereas interest impasses re-
sult from a disagreement between the parties over the specific
terms to be included in a new or renegotiated agreement.
45. Solomon, Summary of Conference in TnE ROLE OF THE NEUTRAL IN
PuBLic EMPLOYEE DISPUTEs 18 (H. Anderson ed. 1972).
Righ ts disputes
In the private sector, the most common method of handling rights
disputes is through arbitration, whereby the parties voluntarily
commit themselves to accept the arbitrator's decision.46 Although
arbitration of grievances in the private sector has been very suc-
cessful, the argument is made that such a practice is inappropriate
for resolving disputes in the public sector because a public em-
ployer cannot delegate his authority to an arbitrator.
Contrary to this contention, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
held that the submission of a public employee grievance to arbitra-
tion did not constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.47
Furthermore, many of the States which have enacted legislation
governing public employee grievance disputes provide for volun-
tary arbitration, and in cases of police or fire-fighter grievances
arbitration is made compulsory.48
The current trend in California is for the parties themselves
to provide in their agreement for binding arbitration as the final
disposition of public employee grievances. 49 The Council rejected
the suggestion that their recommended legislation should include
a provision for mandatory arbitration of rights disputes. Preferring
to allow the parties themselves to decide the issue, the Council sim-
ply stated that legislation should establish the unqualified legal-
ity of public sector grievance arbitration and that the courts would
be required to enforce the arbitration award pursuant to the Code
of Civil Procedure.5"
Since grievance arbitration is essentially an adjudicative, rather
than negotiating process, the Council's recommendation that the
parties have the authority to include in their agreement procedures
for binding arbitration of rights disputes would decrease the possi-
bility that these disputes would lead to a strike. Furthermore, the
morale of the aggrieved employee would undoubtedly improve
46. Final Report, supra note 17, at 179.
47. Local 1226, Rhinelander City Employees, AFSC1ME v. City of Rhine-
lander, 35 Wis. 2d 209, 151 N.W.2d 30 (1967).
48. GILROY & SINICROPI, supra note 37, at 18-21.
49. For illustrations of agreements providing for grievance arbitration,
see the following editions of CAIFoRNiA Pumic EAMPLomE RELATIONS: 15
CPER 39 (November 1972); 12 CPER 56 (March 1972); 10 CPER 26
(August 1971); 7 CPER 43 (November 1970).
50. Final Report, supra note 17, at 185-94. "It should be sufficient to
specify in the statute that proceedings to enforce agreements to arbitrate
and to enforce arbitration awards may be brought pursuant to Title 9(Commencing with § 1280) of Part 3 of Code of Civil Procedure." Id.
at 194.
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where the final disposition of the grievance rests with an impar-
tial neutral rather than with the employer.
Interest disputes
Before grievances reach impasse, they are often satisfactorily re-
solved by a discussion between an employee and his supervisor. If
the immediate parties to the grievance cannot resolve the issue,
usually a representative of the employee, often a business agent of
the union, will confer with a middle-level manager, both parties
working for an equitable solution.
If these representatives fail to reach a solution, the grievance is
negotiated in further meetings by ever-higher level representatives
of the parties. This process continues until either the grievance is
settled or it reaches impasse and must be submitted to arbitration.
In contrast, interest dispute issues, which may eventually reach
impasse in negotiations, are more or less negotiable variables within
the context of ongoing bargaining. Most of these issues will never
reach impasse because the bargaining process functions so that com-
promises can be made and a bargain struck. Therefore, if the
bargaining process can be prolonged, and the dispute subjected
to negotiations, it is likely that the parties will eventually reach an
agreement. Mediation and fact-finding are the techniques most
commonly used to continue the bargaining process beyond impasse
in the hopes of thereby effectuating a settlement.
Professing a strong belief in the desirability of voluntarily
negotiated agreements, the Council stated that the law should allow
the parties to agree to a mutually satisfactory procedure for dis-
pute settlement. 51 Should the parties fail to provide their own
settlement procedure, they would be required to use the dispute
settlement procedure outlined in the Council's proposed legisla-
tion. However, the parties would be allowed to withdraw from
this mandatory settlement procedure whenever they reached
agreement on an alternative, binding, method of dispute resolu-
tion.52
51. Final Report, supra note 17, at 225.
52. Id. at 236-37.
The Council's impasse resolution procedure 3 could be invoked
by either party or by declaration of the Public Employee Relations
Board (PERB) that the negotiations have reached a point where
differences are insurmountable and that further meetings would
be useless. Thereafter, a mediator would be appointed and if he is
unable to help the parties achieve settlement within 15 days, either
party may request that the dispute be submitted to a fact-finding
panel.
Working within specific guidelines, 54 the fact-finding panel must
make its advisory recommendations, privately and in writing, to
the parties within 30 days. If the parties do not immediately ac-
cept the recommendations, they resume negotiations for ten days
before the PERB, the panel, or the parties may make the recom-
mendations public. This ten day negotiation session is provided so
that the parties may negotiate or even mediate the fact-finders'
recommendations.5 5 Should the impasse remain unresolved, the
employee organization must call a meeting where, by a secret bal-
lot, the employees vote on whether or not they will agree to ac-
cept the fact-finders' recommendations. Similarly, the employers'
legislative body votes on the same question. If both votes are
affirmative the impasse is resolved. However, if one or both votes
are negative, the parties may strike or lockout after written noti-
fication is given to the other party, immediately announced to
the public, and five calendar days have passed. If court proceed-
ings undertaken by a request for an injunction determine: 1.)
that the strike (lockout) would immediately threaten public health
or safety; and 2.) that there are no alternative methods for pro-
viding the services to the public, the court could then enjoin the
strike and direct both parties to accept the fact-finders' recommen-
dations. 50
53. The detailed 14-step impasse resolution procedure is set out com-
pletely in the Council's report. Final Report, supra note 17, at 236-240.
54. The fact-finders specified guidelines include the following:
1. the lawful authority of the employer; 2. stipulation of the parties;
3. the interests and welfare of the public and financial ability of the em-
ployer to meet these costs; 4. the wages, hours, and working conditions
of comparable public or private employees; 5. the "cost of living;"
6. the overall compensation presently received by the employees including
benefits; 7. and any other relevant factors. Final Report, supra note 17, at
appendix 28-29.
55. Mediation around the fact-finders' report could prove very helpful
because when the fact-finding follows mediation the parties sometimes
tend to hedge in bargaining in hopes that the fact-finder will be more
favorable to their side than the mediator has been.
56. Final Report, supra note 17, at 237-40.
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The Council's recommended "arsenal of weapons" approach to
settling impasses would provide the necessary bargaining frame-
work to keep the negotiations alive while trained intermediaries use
the techniques of mediation and fact-finding to help the parties
reach their own agreement.
Mediation
Mediation is the most popular form of injecting a neutral force
into the negotiations once an impasse is reached. Nearly all of the
34 states having public employee relations laws provide for media-
tion in cases of impasse.57 Mediation also has a high proven re-
cord of results.5 8 A recent study of dispute settlement procedures
reported that
[a] sampling of the major writers in the field indicates that med-
iation undoubtedly is employed more than any other method for
public sector negotiation disputes and is often considered to be
the most successful process.59
It appears that mediation often has the effect of educating rela-
tively inexperienced public sector negotiators about the bargaining
process itself.6 0 Negotiators in the public sector, unlike the media-
tor or even private sector negotiators, often have very little experi-
ence with the process and behavioral aspects of collective bargain-
ing. "In short, it has been found that the mediator plays a crucial
role not only in bringing about a settlement but in providing a re-
source to the parties in developing their appreciation of the nuances
of the bargaining process." 61 It is quite possible that as media-
tors help the parties become more skillful negotiators their reli-
ance on mediation will diminish and the parties will be able to more
readily negotiate settlements.
Fact-finding
Fact-finding, the next step in the Council's "arsenal of weapons"
57. GILROY & SINICROPI, supra note 37, at 57.
58. In New York over 60 percent of the public school teachers' interest
disputes were settled by mediation. Drotning & Lipsky, The Outcome of
Impasse Procedure in New York Schools Under the Taylor Law, 26 APB.
J. 87, 92 (1971).
59. GmRoY & SINcRopI, supra note 37, at 57 (emphasis added).
60. GiRaoy & SicRoPI, supra note 37, at 58.
61. Id.
approach to dispute settlement, is a process that is often confused
with mediation and advisory arbitration. In practice, fact-finders
do often mediate, 2 and the issuance of a fact-finder's recommen-
dations is similar to an advisory arbitrator's award. But while
public sector fact-finding has ingredients of both processes, it re-
mains distinct in that "[t] he role of the fact-finder-neutral is situa-
tional and often he must direct his efforts from the interests of the
parties to those of the public ....
Fact-finding has also been recommended as a substitute for the
strike. This form of fact-finding would necessitate the parties
agreeing to accept the fact-finder's recommendations as binding
(voluntary binding arbitration) or the State Public Employee Re-
lations Board having the authority to impose a settlement derived
from the fact-finder's report. This procedure is advocated in the
hope that fact-finding can fill the void left by a strike ban, in the
event that mediation fails.64 Despite the difficulties in defining
what a fact-finder is and deciding what he does, there is some
evidence that fact-finders are becoming an increasingly popular
tool in resolving impasses and that they can be credited with a
high rate of successful dispute settlement.6 5
Arbitration
The Council discussed the possibility of using arbitration as a
means of impasse resolution but did not recommend compulsory
arbitration as part of their proposed legislation. Rejecting the
suggestion that the law should mandate arbitration, the Council
reasoned that if the parties felt that their interests would be best
served by settling their disputes by arbitration they could provide
for this result in their negotiated agreement.
Legislation in 23 states provides for arbitration primarily as an
approach to resolve disputes involving police and fire-fighters. 66
Binding arbitration would provide the needed finality to dispute
settlement and it appeals to many as a substitute for the strike.
Where the public employee strike cannot be tolerated, it would
seem that binding arbitration would be the logical substitute for
62. McKelvey, Factfinding in Public Employment Disputes: Promise
or fllusion?, 22 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 528, 531 (1968-69).
63. Gmaoy & SM-ICROPI, supra note 37, at 58-59.
64. Id. at 58.
65. Fact-finding has been adopted by 20 states and the percentage of
cases going to fact-finding that are resolved is ninety percent. Gnaoy &
SwicnoPi, supra note 37, at 58-59.
66. Gaoy & SnxcaoP, supra note 37, at 11-12, 60.
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the strike.6 7
Under the Council's proposed legislation, a strike would be in-
tolerable when a judge determines: 1.) that the strike imminently
threatens public health or safety; and 2.) that there is no other
feasible method of protecting public health or safety.68 In light of
these two "intolerable strike" criteria, the Council's procedures
would provide for compulsory binding arbitration (without label-
ling it as such) in most cases involving police or fire-fighters, be-
cause there are very few substitutes for protecting the public from
fire and crimes for any length of time, other than existing forces,
and secondly, a strike by the police or fire-fighters would neces-
sarily endanger the health and safety of the community. Binding
arbitration would be the result of the Council's procedures in liter-
ally all impasses involving the protective services, without the need
of an arbitrator, because of the Council's proposal that, concomi-
tant with enjoining an intolerable strike, the court directs both
parties to accept the fact-finder's recommendations.6 9 The court
simply imposes the "arbitration award" on the parties as if they
had agreed to be bound by the fact-finders' recommendations. 70
Although there is much conflicting discussion on the "best" meth-
od for resolving impasses in public sector collective bargaining,
support for the Council's recommendations can be derived from
the following excerpt, from the classic study in the area, Pickets
at City HaU.71
[W] e are unanimous in our conviction that good faith negotiations,
aided if necessary by mediation and fact-finding, will in public
as in private employment peacefully settle. .. [most] . . . issues
in which labor and management share an interest. Making these
procedures a legal requirement is the best and surest safeguard
against strikes by government employees.72
67. Note, Labor Management Relations and Public Employees Engaged
in Proctective Functions: Policemen and Firemen as Sui Generis, 5 GA. L.
REv. 540, 548 (1971).
68. Final Report, supra note 17, at 239.
69. See text accompanying note 56, supra.
70. Standoher, A New Alternative to the Strike-Aribitration Choice,
17 CPER 22 (June 1973) (A comparative analysis of traditional arbitration
and the Assembly Advisory Council's proposals).
71. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, PICKETs AT CrIT HALL: REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TAsK FORcE
ON LAiOR DisPuTEs iN PuBLic EMPLOYMENT (1970).
72. Id. at 26.
THE CouNCIL's RECOMMENDATIONS IN CONTEXT:
OTHER STATE LEGISLATION AND TRENDS
There has been considerable activity among state legislatures in
the area of public sector collective bargaining.7 3
Oftentimes legislation is written after an advisory committee,
similar to the California Assembly Advisory Council, is appointed
to study the needs of the particular state.74 The experience of
Pennsylvania indicates one of the reasons why there is consider-
able interest in this sphere of labor law.
Charles T. Douds, the Chief of Staff of the Commission which
recommended Pennsylvania legislation, explained that "Eilt often
requires a crisis or a critical series of events . . . to impel a gov-
ernment to move on a difficult and controversial issue. '7 5 In
Pennsylvania, there was just such a series of events, which in-
cluded a month-long strike of garbage collectors in York and a
three-day teachers' strike in West Mifflin. Consequently, when
20,000 school teachers from throughout Pennsylvania demonstrated
their support for collective bargaining for teachers and other pub-
lic employes at the State Capitol, the Governor appointed a study
commission to recommend legislation for a public employee bar-
gaining law for Pennsylvania.7 6
The Pennsylvania Employee Relations Act of 1970 covers state
and local employees, except police and firemen already governed
by a statute requiring binding arbitration of impasses.77
Pennsylvania law prohibits strikes by employees necessary to the
functions of courts, guards at prisons or mental hospitals, and by
all public employees engaged in the process of collective bargaining,
which includes parties engaged in mediation and fact-finding.78
Strikes are allowed by all other public employees except where the
health, safety or welfare of the public would be endangered.79
The requirement that the "arsenal of weapons" be exhausted be-
for a strike can be instituted, and the express provisions for enjoin-
73. "We know of 129 bills in 43 states concerning public employee la-
bor relations which have been considered during the 1971 legislative ses-
sions.... [A] total of twenty-one bills became law this year." STATE
PROFmES, supra note 2, at iii.
74. See Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employ-
ment Labor Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 McH. L. REV. 891
(1968-69).
75. Douds, Summary of Conference in THE ROLE OF THE NEUTRAL IN
PUBLIc EMPLOYEE DIsPuTEs 5 (1972).
76. Id. at 6.
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.2002 (Supp. 1973).
78. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1101-02 (Supp. 1973).
79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Supp. 1973).
EvoL. 11: 473, 1974] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ing a strike if it jeopardizes the public, is quite similar to the Coun-
cii's approach and recommendations for California.
Hawaii's recent public employee act,80
provides for certification, negotiation, mediation, fact-finding
with publicity for recommendations and, if the dispute continues
30 days after impasse the parties may mutually agree to arbi-
tration by a panel of three arbitrators. If there is no agreement
to arbitrate 60 days after the fact-finding board has made its find-
ing and recommendations public, the employer submits his recom-
mendations for settlement of the dispute and the report of the fact-
finding board to the appropriate legislative body, after which the
employees are free to strike unless the public employer feels there
is danger to the public health and safety, in which case the board
makes a recommendation and if it finds the health or safety is
endangered, "the board shall set requirements that must be com-
plied with to avoid or remove any such imminent or present dan-
ger." 81
Municipal employees in Vermont are permitted to strike if the
strike does not endanger the public safety, health, or welfare. Ver-
mont's state employees are denied the legal right to strike but
strikes by teachers cannot be enjoined unless the court finds that
the commencement or continuance of a strike "poses a clear and
present danger to a sound program of school education .... "182
Alaska uses a three category classification system to determine
the legality of strikes by its public employees. Policemen, fire-
fighters, jail and prison guards and hospital employees are forbid-
den to strike under any circumstances. A second group consists of
those employees whose services may be interrupted for a period of
time. Typical employees in this category would be garbage collec-
tors and teachers. The employees in the second category are al-
lowed to strike after mediation has proved ineffective in settling
the dispute. However, these strikes are limited by a possible judi-
cial determination that the strikes endanger the health, safety and
welfare of the public. All other public employees would be per-
mitted to strike for extended periods if a majority of the bargain-
ing unit votes to do so.83
80. HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 89, §§ 1-20 (Supp. 1972).
81. Douds, supra note 30, at 58.
82. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (Supp. 1973) (municipal employ-
ees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 903 (b) (1972) (state employees); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 16, § 2010 (Supp. 1973) (teachers).
83. ALASKA STAT. tit. 23, § 23.40.200 (1972).
These various state laws and the Council's recommendations
should be analyzed not in terms of "legalizing the right to strike,"
but with reference to their requirements that a legal strike can oc-
cur only after the parties have made a good faith attempt to reach
a negotiated agreement and in making such an attempt have also
exhausted the elaborate procedures provided to help them accom-
plish their negotiating task. In addition, each of these liberalized
state laws specifically provides for injunctive relief if it can be
proven that the commencement or continuation of a strike would
be inimical to the public.
Opinion among writers in this area is divided on the issue of
whether or not "the Hawaii and Pennsylvania laws [are] ...
indicative of a trend toward legalized strikes."84 The question is
not what is philosophically pleasing, which of course depends on
personal biases, but rather which approach is most likely to achieve
the desired goal of effective public employee-management relations
and elimination of the disruptions to the community inherent in
strikes by public employees. Unfortunately it is still too early to
make a definite statement in answer to that question. As a recent
study on dispute settlement procedure in the public sector, com-
missioned by the United States Department of Labor, points out:
The debate on public employee strikes has continued for a decade.
It will, no doubt, continue until experience and an analysis of that
experience provides better answers than can now be provided.85
Although the correctness of a State's decision to liberalize its laws
governing public employee strikes and provide for statutory impasse
resolution procedures is still in doubt, the fact that the aforemen-
tioned states have changed their strike prohibitions and that many
states are currently considering new public employee relations legis-
lation does indicate the trend may be in the direction, if not to the
degree, of the Council's recommendations.
CONCLUSION
In light of the growing militancy of public employee unions,.8
and the ever-increasing number of strikes in the public sector, it
seems that the innovative collective bargaining laws of Hawaii, Ver-
mont, Alaska and Pennsylvania and the similar proposals of the
California Assembly Advisory Council are a more realistic way of
dealing with labor relations problems in the public sector. Since
84. Gmnioy & Smicopri, supra note 37, at 62.
85. Id.
86. For a discussion of the reasons behind this growing militancy see
ACIR, supra note 1, at 10.
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the present laws neither legalize the right of public employees to
strike, nor provide for an "arsenal of weapons" approach to re-
solve impasses; and since there have been repeated public employee
strikes,8 7 the Council's recommendation that employees could le-
gally strike only after they have used the impasse resolution pro-
cedures outlined in the Report, or alternative procedures, would
force public employees to use, at least initially, negotiating tactics
and neutrals rather than economic warfare.
Currently, when an employee organization is met with sufficient
frustration, which seems inherent in a "meet and confer" system,""
the organization will advocate a strike despite its illegality. Pres-
ent law cannot prevent strikes nor does it provide for a meaningful
alternative for negotiations which have reached impasse. But if
the parties were required to use step-by-step procedures to resolve
their differences before they could strike or lockout, it is possible
that an agreement would be reached before a strike commenced.
Without mandating compulsory procedures or outlawing strikes, the
Council's proposals, if adopted, should make it far easier to control
public sector strikes while reducing their incidence.
In contrast to the present timid California public employee rela-
tions laws, the Advisory Council's recommendations are straight-
forward and imaginative. Although the current California politi-
cal climate may not be conducive to innovative changes in regard
to public sector collective bargaining laws,89 the Assembly Advisory
Council's Report should have a key role in shaping future legisla-
tion in California and perhaps elsewhere.
MIcHAEL E. HooToN
87. Not only is the number of public sector strikes increasing in Cal-
ifornia, but the rate seems to be also increasing, as compared with New
York. Bowen & Aussieker, Teacher Negotiations in a Changing Environ-
ment, 11 CPER 2, 15-16 (November 1971).
88. It was estimated that 75% of the strikes by public school teachers
in California from February, 1969 to June, 1971 resulted from frustrations
with the "meet and confer" provisions of the Winton Act. Id. at 7.
89. See note 24, supra.
